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Clausen: Tort Law: An Expansion of Florida's Litigation Privilege

CASE COMMENT
TORT LAW: AN EXPANSION OF FLORIDA'S
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994)
Keith Clausen*
Appellant filed suit in federal district court for tortious interference
with a business relationship, alleging that appellee intentionally and
without cause disqualified appellant as opposing counsel in a previous
case.' Appellee moved to dismiss the action, alleging that its conduct
was protected by the absolute immunity afforded actions during
litigation.2 The district court granted appellee's motion to dismiss based
on the absolute immunity afforded by Florida's litigation privilege.3 On
appeal, finding Florida law unclear on the issue, the Eleventh Circuit
certified the question of privilege to the Florida Supreme Court.4 The

* Dedicated to my mother and father, Judy Clausen and Edward Clausen.
1. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994). The facts giving rise to this action are somewhat
complicated. Initially, a personal injury action was filed against Daniel Ornamental Iron
Company (Daniel). Id. Daniel's primary insurer, United States Fire Insurance (U.S. Fire), failed
to settle the case within its primary policy limit of $500,000. Id. The case proceeded to trial,
where the plaintiff secured ajudgment of $863,287 against Daniel. Id. Daniel's excess insurance
carrier, Morrisson Assurance Company (Morrisson), had to pay the excess of the judgment
because it was over the primary insurer's limit. See id. Morrisson then hired the Levin firm on
a contingency fee basis to bring a bad faith action against U.S. Fire for its failure to settle the
claim within the $500,000 policy limit. Id.
The Levin firm also had represented the initial plaintiff in the personal injury suit against
Daniel. Id. U.S. Fire certified to the trial court that it would call Lefferts Mabie, an attorney for
the Levin firm, as a fact witness in the bad faith action. Id. On this ground, U.S. Fire moved for
disqualification of Mabie and the Levin firm, and the trial judge disqualified both of them. Id.
U.S. Fire never called or even subpoenaed Mabie as a witness, however, and never gave notice
to the trial court that it would not call him. Id. The bad faith action against U.S. Fire went to
trial, and Morrisson's new counsel won a final judgment for $638,237. Id.
2. Id. For a description of the privilege, see text accompanying infra notes 8-9.
3. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607.
4. Id. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question:
WHETHER CERTIFYING TO A TRIAL COURT AN INTENT TO CALL
OPPOSING COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
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court answered the question in the affirmative 5 and HELD, that
Florida's litigation privilege extends absolute immunity to a claim of
tortious interference with a business relationship for acts arising during
and related to judicial proceedings.6
As in most jurisdictions, Florida's litigation privilege is deeply rooted
in traditional common law.7 The litigation privilege grew out of the
common law privilege for defamatory and libelous statements made
during litigation.8 No statements made during litigation by a party,
witness, lawyer, or judge could subsequently be the basis for a claim of
0 the Florida
libel, slander, or defamation.9 In Myers v. Hodges,"
Supreme Court explained the history and policy underlying the litigation
privilege, distinguishing between an absolute and a qualified
privilege. "
The Myers court examined the evolution of the immunity in England,
construing the English litigation privilege to apply to any statement
made during a judicial proceeding by a party, witness, judge, or
lawyer.' 2 It contrasted the English rule with the corresponding
American rule, which afforded defamatory words published during a
judicial proceeding absolute immunity only if they were relevant or
material to the subject of litigation. 3 The court noted the arguments in
favor of the broader English rule. 4 Despite these arguments, the Myers

COUNSEL'S DISQUALIFICATION, AND LATER FAILING TO SUBPOENA
AND CALL COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL, IS AN ACTION THAT IS
ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM A CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF FLORIDA'S
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.
Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 608.
7. See Myers v. Hodges, 44 So. 357, 360-61 (Fla. 1907). The litigation privilege is
grounded in English common law, id. at 360, and has been incorporated into Florida law by
statute. See FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1993). Most U.S. jurisdictions accept the privilege. Myers, 44
So. at 360.
8. See Myers, 44 So. at 360 (describing the protection afforded by the traditional
common law litigation privilege to libelous, slanderous, or defamatory statements made during
litigation).
9. See id.
10. 44 So. 357 (Fla. 1907).
11. See id. at 360-61.
12. See id. at 360.
13. See id. at 360-61.
14. See id. at 361. First, the Myers court observed that the public interest demands great
freedom in complaints and allegations so that they can be investigated and the truth can be
brought out. See id. Furthermore, the interests of justice can be served through the adversary
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court rejected the English rule.'5 It reasoned that restricting the absolute
privilege to defamatory statements on matters within the realm of
inquiry would further the interests of justice." The Myers court
concluded that the immunity would thwart its own purpose if it could
be used to allow obviously malicious and irrelevant statements to remain
unreachable in the name of justice.' 7
Accordingly, the Myers court limited the absolute privilege to words
published by a lawyer, party, witness, or judge during a judicial
proceeding that were relevant to the proceeding.' Any irrelevant
statements made during litigation or in the course of a judicial procedure
were afforded a qualified privilege. 9 This qualified privilege entitled
the defamatory speaker to a presumptive privilege which could be
overcome only by proof of actual malice.2"
In modifying the English rule of absolute immunity with a relevance
qualifier, the Myers court added protection against abuse of the
privilege.2 With this added protection, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the litigation privilege, immunizing the long-protected torts of
libel, slander, and defamation.' It would be eighty-two years before
another cause of action would be protected by the litigation privilege in
Florida. Then, in Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman,23 Florida's
Third District Court of Appeal applied the absolute privilege to a claim
of extortion, a cause of action not included in the group of historically

system if parties and lawyers have extensive latitude in their speech. See id. Finally, the court
noted that defamatory statements can be adequately punished through the judge's contempt
power. Id.
15. See id. at 362.
16. Id. at 361-62.
17. Id. at 362. The court bemoanfed the possible outcome in which the only compensation
available to a defamed person, who may have suffered grave financial harm, is the satisfaction
of seeing the libeler contribute a minor contempt fine to the public coffer. Id.; see also Fridovich
v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992) (discussing the unfairness inherent in preventing
someone who is wronged during litigation from bringing an action); Judith Kilpatrick,
Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power and a Breath of Fresh Air for the Attorney
Discipline System, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1069, 1086-93 (1992) (discussing the inadequacy of the
alternative means of rectifying injury occasioned during litigation and concluding that neither
a judge's contempt power, nor bar sanctions, nor Rule 11 sanctions, nor criminal sanctions
would work as effectively as civil proceedings).
18. Myers, 44 So. at 362.
19. Id.
20. See id. Proof of actual malice means that malice will under no circumstances be
implied; unless the complainant furnishes actual proof of malice, there can be no recovery. See
id.
21. See id. at 361-62.
22. See id.
23. 545 So. 2d 309 (3d DCA), rev. denied, 554 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1989).
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protected torts.24
In Zuckerman, the appellees alleged libel and extortion arising from
statements contained in a motion filed with the court during a
2
Discussing the policy underlying the
partnership dissolution actionY.
26
litigation privilege, the court concluded that a libel action could not
be maintained because the defamatory statements were relevant and
made in the course of litigation, and thus absolutely immune from
suit.27 Using the same policy analysis, the Zuckerman court also barred
the extortion claim, which was based on the identical statements as the
libel claim.28 The court noted several cases in which absolute immunity
precluded other tort claims arising out of judicial proceedings. 9
Finally, the court stated that even without the privilege, the appellees

24. See id. at 310.
25. Id. at 309-10. In a footnote, the court included the statements allegedly giving rise to
the claim for libel and extortion:
The action below involves, inter alia, the dissolution of a partnership for the
practice of law. Substantial sums of money are at issue and Appellants have used
delaying tactics solely to allow them to purloin for themselves monies otherwise
belonging to the partnership. Appellants have involved the clients of the former
partnership in the litigation by fraudulent and unethical means of obtaining
payments of funds not rightfully theirs while assuring said clients that Appellees
had no claim to the funds.
Id. at 310 n.4.
26. Id. at 310. The court repeated the policy reasons as described in another Florida case:
"In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that
lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act
on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written
during the litigation."
Id. (quoting Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (alteration in
original)).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also supra note 25 (containing the allegedly libelous assertions). In fact, the
court did not do a separate analysis for the extortion claim. Zuckernan, 545 So. 2d at 310. The
court simply stated, after its analysis of the libel claim, that "[t]he same analysis applies to the
extortion claim, which is based on the same statement in the same motion. The absolute
immunity for statements made in judicial proceedings precludes civil liability." Id. The
Zuckerman court then cited a number of cases which precluded liability for civil actions. See id.
(citing Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (perjury); Perl v. Omni
Int'l, 439 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (fraud); Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So.
2d 47, 48, 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (slander of title; injurious falsehood)).
29. See cases cited supra note 28.
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failed to show a prima facie claim for extortion." Because the
extortion claim arose out of the same statements as the libel claim and
appeared weak on the merits, the court simply applied the same
immunity to the extortion claim as it applied to the libel claim.3 '
In contrast to the Zuckerman court's loose application of absolute
privilege to a previously unprivileged tort, the Florida Supreme Court
limited the application of an absolute litigation privilege in Fridovich v.
Fridovich.32 In Fridovich, the court declined to extend an absolute
privilege to defamatory statements made to authorities prior to the
initiation of criminal proceedings, but instead embraced a qualified
privilege for such statements.33 In Fridovich, the plaintiff sought
compensation for defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress,
and malicious prosecution arising from an alleged conspiracy by his
brother, sister, and sister's former husband, to have him charged with
murder in the death of his father.34 After an initial police investigation
had cleared the plaintiff of any guilt in the death of his father, the
conspirators chose the plaintiff's sister and her former husband to lie to
the police. These two liars convinced the police that the plaintiff
intentionally killed his father.36 As a result, the police reopened the
investigation and ultimately charged the plaintiff with murder.37 After
a jury found the plaintiff guilty of manslaughter, the two accusers
38
recanted, admitting that their statements to the police were false.
The Fridovich court recognized that the public policy underlying the
30. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d at 310.
31. See id.
32. 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992).
33. Id. at 69. The court's ruling was contrary to previous authority. See id. at 67 (citing
Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1954) (holding that an absolute
privilege applied to statements made in a letter to an insurance commissioner used to institute
proceedings); Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929) (holding that an absolute privilege
applied to statements made to a county judge to whom the defendant had gone for a warrant)).
The court relied on two lower court opinions, Anderson v. Shands, 570 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla.
Ist DCA 1990) and Ridge v. Rademacher, 402 So. 2d 1312, 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), which
had applied a qualified privilege in similar pre-indictment situations. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at
67. The court in Fridovich narrowed application of the absolute privilege partly in response to
the lower courts' dissatisfaction with the holdings of Ange and Robertson. See id. at 67, 69.
Also, the court looked to other jurisdictions, noting that most had embraced a qualified privilege
in such a situation. See id. at 67-68.
34. Fridovich,598 So. 2d at 66.
35. Id. As part of the conspiracy, the plaintiff's siblings bought a stress analyzer to
determine who could lie most convincingly to the police. Id. at 68.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. After this admission and reversal of the manslaughter conviction on other grounds,
the plaintiff was retried without the false testimony and was again convicted. Id.
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litigation privilege was to facilitate the free flow of information during
judicial proceedings without fear of retaliation.39 Also, the court
acknowledged that some authorities recognize statements to the police
as a first step in a prosecution. 41' Therefore, these statements would be
part of a judicial proceeding and absolutely immune from liability.4 '
Nevertheless, the court declined to extend absolute immunity on such
egregious facts,4" noting that such protection would frustrate the very
purpose of the courts.4 3

Instead, the Fridovich court embraced a qualified privilege similar to
the one described in Myers.44 Under a qualified privilege, the plaintiff
would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defamatory statements were false and uttered with express malice.4 ' To
prove express malice, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
primary purpose in making the statements was to injure the plaintiffs
reputation. 46 The court reasoned that a qualified privilege afforded
statements the protection they needed, without allowing obvious
malicious abuse of the judicial system.47 A qualified privilege would
protect the free flow of information in judicial proceedings, while
preventing evil-intentioned conspirators like plaintiffs siblings from
avoiding responsibility for their actions.48
Unlike the Fridovich court, the court in the instant case failed to
consider the possibility of extending a qualified privilege and looked
only to the possibility of absolute immunity. 49 The instant court
39. Id. at 68.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 68-69. The Fridovich court emphasized that the purchase of the stress analyzer,
see supra note 35, indicated malicious manipulation of the criminal process in its ruling denying
absolute immunity to the conspirators. Id. The purchase of the stress analyzer showed the length
to which the parties went to misuse the judicial process, betraying a need for possible civil
sanctions to punish such abuse and compensate the victim. See id. at 68-69. Such obvious abuse
of the judicial process seemed central to the court's decision. See id. at 68.
43. Id. at 68-69. The Fridovich court reasoned that "an absolute privilege would frustrate
the principle that the courts should be open to redress every wrong." Id. The Fridovich court
echoed the Myers court, which voiced the same concern. See Myers, 44 So. at 362; supra note
17 and accompanying text.
44. See Fridovich,598 So. 2d at 69; Myers, 44 So. at 362.
45. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69.
46. Id.
47. See id. The court stated that "a qualified privilege is 'sufficiently protective of [those]
wishing to report events concerning crime and balances society's interest in detecting and
prosecuting crime with a defendant's interest not to be falsely accused.' "Id. (quoting Fridovich
v. Fridovich, 573 So. 2d 65, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)).
48. See id.
49. See Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607-09 (applying an absolute privilege without considering
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reasoned that the policy underlying absolute immunity for libel, slander,
and defamation applied equally to other torts."' By extending absolute
immunity to protect an attorney's misconduct from a claim of tortious
interference with a business relationship, the instant court expanded
Florida's litigation privilege to protect torts outside the historically
protected arena of libel, slander, and defamation."
The instant court recognized that the question of extending litigation
immunity to other torts was one it had not previously addressed. 2
Citing two Florida lower court decisions which extended absolute
immunity to previously unprotected torts,53 the instant court reasoned
that the rationale behind absolute immunity for defamatory statements
applied equally to other types of misconduct.54 According to the instant
court, the critical question in extending immunity was whether the
misconduct occurred during the course of litigation and was related to
it.55 Litigants and their counsel must feel free to defend or prosecute
a lawsuit using their best judgment, without the specter of subsequent
civil liability for misconduct. 6 Although affording absolute immunity
for misconduct may bar recovery for actual injuries, the instant court
observed that denying it would create a chilling effect on litigation
conduct.5 7
While providing a defendant an absolute privilege from tort liability,
the instant court stated that misconduct during judicial proceedings
would not go unsanctioned. 8 As an alternative to potential civil
liability, a trial court could use its contempt power to "vindicate its
authority and protect its integrity" by imposing a fine as sanction for the
misconduct. 9 Thus, misconduct by attorney or client, even though

or analyzing the possibility of applying a qualified privilege).
50. Id. at 608.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Zuckennan, 545 So. 2d at 310 (extending absolute immunity to action for
libel and extortion arising from statements made in a motion filed with the court); Sailboat Key,
Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (affording absolute immunity to action for
slander of title)).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id. But see Kilpatrick, supra note 17, at 1082-86 (arguing that our adversary system
does not need absolute immunity to protect the zeal of advocates, and that the feared chilling
effect would not materialize).
58. See Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608-09.
59. Id. at 609. Additionally, the instant court referred to discipline by the bar association
or by the State in a criminal proceeding as ways to sanction litigation misconduct. Id. at 608
(citing Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)).
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absolutely privileged, can still be punished through use of the court's
contempt power.'
Unfortunately, the instant court failed to examine the possible
repercussions of immunizing attorney misconduct from tort liability in
today's litigation environment, and in doing so ignored the possibility
of offering a qualified immunity for torts outside the cluster of
historically protected misstatements.6 In Fridovich, the court surmised
that a qualified immunity would suffice to protect the free flow of
information in a judicial proceeding, yet prevent serious abuse and
misuse of the privilege.62 Because the statements in Fridovich were
made before the initiation of a judicial proceeding, the court rationalized
affording qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity. 3 Though
the actions at issue were of the type traditionally protected by the
absolute privilege, the Fridovich court refused to allow such obvious
misconduct to remain protected.' 4 As a result, this decision put a sharp
limitation on the absolute privilege. Similarly, the instant court could
have extended a qualified privilege for torts arising from misconduct
during litigation, yet outside the core cluster of historically protected
torts of libel, slander, and defamation.
Without any Florida decision clearly mandating an extension of the
absolute immunity to other tort claims,65 the instant court could have
prevented this expansion of immunity for litigation-related misconduct.
The instant court admitted that it had not previously addressed this
issue.6 6 The Zuckerman case, cited as extending the privilege to other
types of torts,67 clearly was not controlling.68
Assuming arguendo that Zuckerman was controlling, the claims
afforded absolute immunity in Zuckerman were not as clearly distinct
from the historically protected actions as was the claim in the instant

60. See id. at 608-09.
61. See Kilpatrick, supra note 17, at 1082. Professor Kilpatrick, after examining the
absolute litigation immunity as it applies to trial lawyers, concluded that the immunity's
protection "allows reckless or unethical lawyers to run rampant, ignoring any harm they
produce." See id. The only possible justification for this absolute immunity in today's litigation
environment is lawyers' "professional self-interest." Id.
62. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69.
63. See id. at 66.
64. Id. at 69.
65. See infra note 68 and text accompanying notes 66-68.
66. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608.
67. Id.
68. The instant court did not cite Zuckerman as controlling authority, but merely as
persuasive authority for extending the absolute privilege to torts outside the group of
traditionally privileged actions. Id.
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695

case. In Zuckerman, the appellees alleged libel and extortion. 69 The
libel claim is a historically protected claim," while the extortion claim
was based on the same statement that gave rise to the claim of libel.7
Because of the overlapping nature of these claims, the court found the
actions practically indistinguishable and carried over the absolute
privilege for the libel claim to the extortion claim without analysis.72
In addition, the Zuckerman court emphasized that even without the
privilege, the appellees failed to make a prima facie case for
extortion. 73 Because of the weak extortion claim on the merits, and the
derivative nature of the absolute privilege to the extortion claim,
Zuckerman does not present a compelling argument for extension of the
absolute privilege in the instant case.
In the instant case, appellant alleged tortious interference with 75a
business relationship 7 4 -not one of the historically protected torts.
The complaint claimed that tortious interference with a business
relationship occurred during the actual conduct of litigation.76 Unlike
Zuckerman, there is no close relationship between the cause of action
and a historically protected tort in the instant case." Appellant claimed
no libel, slander, or defamation, nor did it claim a derivative cause of
action.78 Thus, the authority cited for extending
the absolute privilege
79
is easily distinguishable from the instant case.

69. See Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d at 309.

70. See Myers, 44 So. at 362.
71. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d at 310; supra note 25.
72. See Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d at 310; supra note 28.
73. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d at 310.

74. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607.
75. See Myers, 44 So. at 357 (describing the development of the litigation privilege around
the core cluster of historically protected torts of defamation, libel, and slander).
76. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607.
77. See infra note 79.

78. See Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607.
79. Along with Zuckerman, the instant court cited Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So.
2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), as support for its decision to extend an absolute privilege to a
previously unprotected tort. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. In Sailboat Key, the appellant sued
alleging slander of title after the appellee sought to prevent him from improving his property.
SailboatKey, 378 So. 2d at 47. The appellee's allegations prevented the appellant from obtaining
financing, subsequently forcing him to sell the property. Id. at 47-48. In allowing absolute
privilege to preclude the suit, the Sailboat Key court discussed the close relationship between
slander and slander of title. See id. at 48. "Florida courts have repeatedly recognized the
interplay between libel and slander on the one hand, and 'slander of title' on the other." id.
Therefore, the court equated the "slander of title" action with the historically protected torts of
libel and slander, providing a basis on which to extend the absolute immunity to the slander of
title action. See id. at 48-49.
In contrast, the claim in the instant case was for tortious interference with a business
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Without precedent compelling the extension of an absolute privilege,
the instant court could have reexamined the policy underlying the
litigation privilege in light of modern conditions." In Myers, the court
modified the English rule of absolute litigation privilege for any
statement made during a judicial proceeding by requiring that the
statement be relevant to the proceedings.' In Fridovich, the court again
embraced a qualified privilege, establishing definite contours around the
absolute privilege."2 The Fridovich court had a solid basis for its
refusal to extend absolute immunity-the statements at issue were made
before the initiation of the judicial proceeding. 3 Similarly, the instant
court had a solid legal basis to extend a qualified rather than an absolute
privilege; the tort complained of, tortious interference with a business
relationship, has never enjoyed absolute immunity in Florida. 4 It is not
one of the actions against which the immunity was historically intended
to protect.8" By extending the litigation immunity to torts outside the
historically protected cluster, the instant court has ignored the warnings
of Fridovich and Myers and blurred the lines of application of the
privilege. 6
Absolute litigation privilege is a powerful doctrine which offers
absolute immunity despite malice by the actor or tremendous harm to
the victim. By extending this doctrine beyond its historically defined
limits, the instant court has implicitly condoned unethical and abusive
litigation conduct by attorneys and others. In Fridovich, the court had
before it a case with "egregious" facts which contributed to its decision
not to extend absolute immunity.8 9 Were a claim like the instant case
to arise, with facts as egregious as those in Fridovich, the court would

relationship, see Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607, a claim which has no such close relationship with the

historically privileged torts.
80. See Kilpatrick, supra note 17, at 1082 (arguing that a "[c]urrent rethinking of the

lawyer's role, and a movement toward restricting traditional privileges and immunities, require
reassessment of such an extraordinary lawyer's immunity in our legal system").
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See
See
See
See
See

Myers, 44 So. at 362.
Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69; supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 66; supra note 33 and text accompanying notes 42-43.
Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608.
id.

86. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17, 44-48.
87. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, supra note 17, at 1069-70 (describing severe harm to a plaintiff
for which the plaintiff could not successfully seek redress because of the absolute litigation

privilege).
88. See id. at 1084 (detailing the numerous ethical rules that attorneys must follow, then
asserting that, because of absolute litigation immunity, lawyers may ignore rules when making
statements or performing acts related to a judicial proceeding).
89. See Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 68.
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have to immunize the offender from any civil liability. Assuming that
the court follows its own precedent, it has precluded liability for tortious
interference with a business relationship arising in litigation, no matter
how despicable the conduct. A qualified privilege, while protecting any
good faith litigation activity, would allow the injured party to recover
in an "egregious" case.' The instant court has expanded a doctrine that
the Myers court warned against extending too far.9 With the current
litigation atmosphere, the court in the instant case should have
considered extending a qualified litigation immunity.92

90. See, e.g., Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69; supra note 17.
91. Myers, 44 So. at 362. The court in Myers warned in strong language against
overextension of the privilege:
The law would be a vain thing indeed to shut the gates of justice in [the victim's]
face, and at the same time fetter his hands by the command: 'Thou shalt not kill."
The person accused may have suffered great financial loss by the slander published
under the protection of the law, and the only compensation or consolation he would
have would be the indulgence in the reflection that the court had enriched the
public treasury with a fine collected from his defamer.
Id.
92. Professor Kilpatrick notes that the current litigation atmosphere is characterized by an
adversarial standard that " 'the lawyer should play to win, within the rules, if possible.' "
Kilpatrick, supra note 17, at 1087 (quoting Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming
Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 14 (1987)).
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